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Newspiapier Libel-Presumption as to Malice and Retraction in their
Relation to Damages.
i. In an action for libel for publishing a newspaper article stating that
plaintiff was arrested for larceny, and giving the number of his residence,
the publication is presumed to be malicious and evidence that another
person of the same name as plaintiff was arrested does not show, as a
matter of law, that defendant intended in good faith to refer to such
other person and, therefore, does not relieve him of punitive damages.
2. Evidence of a retraction by a newspaper of a libellous article is admissible in mitigation of damages if published before suit is brought.
3. No presumption of law exists by which a mere retraction becomes
evidence of absence of malice in publishing such libellous article.
RETRACTION OF LIBEL.

Save in the most flagrant cases, harmonious social intercourse requires that a retraction of words causing offense or
injury shall be accepted as a full withdrawal of the cause of
displeasure and operate as a complete satisfaction for the
injury ensuing. This is especially true when the words
spoken are not the result of ill-will or malice but merely due
to ignorance or indifference. Socially, he would be reckoned
a boor, who under such circumstances, would refuse to
accept and acknowledge an apology.
With less leniency but more justice, the law recognizes that
the injury due to defamation, whether wilful or through negligence, is not repaired by a retraction, that the impression
made by words spoken or written is not effaced by their re-.
'Reported in 6I N. W. 504.
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call and exacts that the injury produced be fully compensated.
Holding, here as' elsewhere, that a man shall be held responsible for the natural consequences of his acts, and viewing
libel as a necessarily voluntary act, the-publisher of a libellous
newspaper article is held to have intended all the mischief and
injury it may produce, this intent is denominated malicious,
and for this presumed malice punitive damages may be given,
as wefl as substantial damages for the actual injury. Proof
of the absence of such malice may offset the vindictive, and
a retraction offset the actual damages, but the "net " injury
must be satisfied, and, broadly speaking, is the balance obtained
by deducting from the defamatory effect of the original publication the corrective effect of the withdrawal of the words
of offense. In striking this subtle and evasive "balances" the
jury acts as a board of accountants, with the instructions of
the court as its manual.
In aggravation of damages evidence may be given of malice
or gross negligence, of the extent of publication, the position
of the parties, etc., (Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, v. 13, p. 438;
Odgers on Libel, *p. 295; Newell on Defamation, p. 876),
and in mitigation it is admissible to prove the absence of
malice, the truth of the publication, the degree of provocation
and in general all matters which tend to justify or excuse the
defendant: Odgers, *p. 299; Am. and Eng. Encycl. Law,
P. 439. The motive in publishing a libel will be seen to go
to the very root of the question of damages. In the case of
the ordinary newspaper libel, however, published either
through accident or neglect, with no special motive in publishing, and followed in due season by a retraction, three
questions arise, which must be answered before a jury can be
said to have any safe guide in determining the amount of
damages to be awarded.
I. Admitting the article to be libellous and no proof offered
of absence of malice in publishing it, what is the presumption
of law as to the motive of publication in. its relation to damages ?
2. Under what conditions does subsequent retraction affect
damages ?

RETRACTION OF LIBEL.

J. To what extent is the retraction evidence of the motive
of the publisher, that the original publication was without
malice or for justifiable ends?
As to the first point it seems to be definitely settled that
where the words are libellous in themselves, punitive damages
may be given if thought proper by the jury without evidence
of malice beyond the words: Odgers, *p. 291, n. b.; Am.
and Eng. Ency. Law, v. 13, p. 433, n. I. The immediate au"thorities cited by the case under discussion in support of the
proposition that punitive damages may follow malice which,
without being proved is presumed, as a matter of law, are:
Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 451 [1868];
Whittemore v. Weiss, 33 Mich. 353 [1876]; Sciinpps v. Reilly,
38 Mich. 25 [1878]; Ass'n v. Tryon, 42 Mich. 549 [i88O];
Bacon v.R. R. Co., 55 Mich. 224; 21 N.W. 324 [1884];
Newell Defam., pp. 319, 321.

The first case, Detroit Daily

Post Co. v. McArthur, contains a very careful and elaborate
opinion by CAMPBELL, J., in which he says: "The law favors
the freedom of the press, so long as it does not interfere with
private reputation or other rights entitled to protection, and,
inasmuch as the newspaper press is one of the necessities
of civilization, the conditions, under which it is required to be conducted, should not be unreasonable or vexatious. But the reading public are not entitled to discussions
in print upon the character or doings of private persons, except as developed in legal tribunals or voluntarily subjected to
public scrutiny, and since an injurious statement inserted in a
popular journal does more harm to the person slandered than
can possibly be wrought by any other species of publicity,
the care required of such journals must be such as to reduce
the risk of having such libels creep into their columns to the
lowest degree, which reasonable foresight can assure " * * *
"It is in connection with the various degrees of blameworthiness chargeable on wrongdoers that the discussions have
arisen on the subject of vindictive or exemplary damages,
which, inasmuch as they rest upon actual fault, are by some
authorities said to be designed to punish the wrong intent,
while, according to others, the damages usually so called are
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only meant to recompense the sense of injury, which, is in
human experience, always aggravated or lessened in proportion to the degree of perversity exhibited by the offender.
While the term exemplary or vindictive, damages has become
so fixed in the law that it may be difficult to get rid of it, yet
it should not be allowed to be used so as to mislead, and we
think the only proper application of damages beyond those to
person, property or reputation is to make reparation for the
injury to the feelings of the person injured." * * * " The
injury to the feelings is only allowed to be considered in those
torts, which consist of some voluntary act or very gross neglect, and practically depends very closely on the degree of
fault evinced by all the circumstances. It has been very
wisely left to the jury to determine each case upon its own
surroundings, because the only safe rule of damages in
matters .of feeling is to give what, to the ordinary apprehension of impartial men, would seem proportionate to an injury,
which must be measured by the instincts of our common
humanity." * * * " There is no doubt of the duty of every
publisher to see at all hazards that no libel appears in his
paper. Every publisher is, therefore, liable, not only for the
estimated damages to credit and reputation, and such special
damages as may appear, but also for such damages on
account of injured feelings as must unavoidably be inferred
from such a libel, published in a paper of such position and
character." * * *

"When

it appears that the mischief has

been done in spite of precautions, he ought to have all the
allowance in his favor, which such carefulness would justify
in mitigation of that portion of the damages which is awarded
on account of injured feelings." While basing the award of
vindictive damages on the ground of injured feelings rather
than punishment of the author of the libel, the rule as to damages is the same. The original presumption of malice in publishing a libellous article continues until it is shown that the
mischief has been done in spite of precautions, and when the
defendant has shown this, it is for the jury to say to what extent it mitigates the injury to feelings and abates the punitive
damages.
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In Whittenore v. Weiss, (supra), the court, in answering one
of the assignments of error, says: " It is alleged for error that
the judge refused to charge that, unless the jury should find
that the publication complained of occasioned an actual injury
and loss of trade to the plaintiff then, under the declaration,
which only alleged such injury, the plaintiff could only recover
nominal damages. That might be true if the words had not
been actionable per se; but being so, if the jury found they
were maliciously published, the jury could not, whatever the
proof as to the influence upon business, be thus limited in
their verdict."
It thus appears that where only special damage is alleged,
the jury is still at liberty to inflict punitive damages on finding
malice in the words themselves, and going a step farther,
Scrz.Pps v. Reilly, holds that in order to escape such punitive
damages, it must be shown that the publication was made in
spite of proper precautions on the part of the publisher of the
newspaper. The words of the decision are "Where the tort
-consists of some voluntary act, but no element of malice, carelessness or gross negligence is shown to have existed, but that
the wrong was done in spite of proper precautions, the damages to be awarded on account of injured feelings, will be
reduced to such sum as must inevitably have resulted from
the wrong itself." This is following Detroit Post Co. v. JjrcArthur, where we have seen that damages awarded for injured
feelings is used in the sense of vindictive damages.
To the same effect as Scripps v. Reilly, is Evening News
Ass'n v. Tryon, (supra), which holds "In cases like the present
(an action for words libellous per se), the publication is considered a voluntary act and is presumed to have proceeded
from malicious motives, thus entitling the plaintiff to recover
exemplary damages. If it appears upon the trial that there
was no intention in fact to injure the plaintiff, and that all
proper precautions were observed in the publication of the
article complained of, such facts will not prevent a recovery of
such damages, but will reduce the amount thereof to such
sums as must inevitably have resulted from the wrong."
The present case, Davis v. Marxhausen, was an action for
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libel for publication of a newspaper article, stating that the
plaintiff was arrested for larceny, and giving the number of
his residence. Evidence of two separate retractions was given,
showing that a person of the same name as the plaintiff had
been arrested under the circumstances set forth in the original
libel, but it was held that this did not show, as matter of
law, that the defendant intended in good faith to refer to such
other person, MONTGOMERY, J., saying, " It was competent for
the defendant to offer testimony to show the want of actual
malice, as that the publication was made through mistake, and
that all proper precautions were observed, by which the damages will be reduced to such a sum as will compensate for the
injury which must inevitably have resulted. But the defendant did not, in this case, make these facts appear conclusively.
The circumstances of the publication are not shown, except as
the jury are left to infer that because another Michael Davis
was arrested the defendant must, in publishing this- libel, have
intended, in good faith, to refer to that Michael Davis and not
to the plaintiff." And no such proof of the absence of malice
or the employment of proper care and precaution having been,
presented on behalf of the defendant, the opinion endorses the
following requests for instructions to the jury, which had been
rejected by the court below: I. "The law presumes that the
article was published maliciously, and the burden is upon the
defendant to show that he acted in good faith and with proper
motive." 2. "The wilful publication of injurious statements
involves the design to produce whatever injury must necessarily follow, and when done purposely, knowingly, and for no
good purpose or justifiable end, it is malicious, in the sight of
the law, even if done without any actual personal ill-will."
In the absence of any proof of motive, the words being libellous in themselves, the charge of the court below was held to
be error, which said "there was no evidence from which
improper motives on the part of the defendant could be
inferred." It would seem to be good law therefore that, there
being no evidence of motive beyond the mere words of the
libel, punitive damages may be given by the jury, the words
being actionable in themselves.
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In general, a retraction is competent evidence in mitigation
of damages if made before suit is brought and immediately
following the libel. But, in order to be effective, a "retraction
should be made as publicly as the charge, and, as far as possible, to the same persons; and the defendant should do his
utmost to stop the further sale of the libel. It should be
printed in type of ordinary size, and in a part of the paper
where it will be seen, not hidden away among advertisements
or notices to correspondents:" Am. and Eng. Ency. Law v.
13, p. 442;

See also, Newell on Defam., p. 907; Odgers,
Libel and Slan. *p. 299. The recent case of Turton v. N. Y.

Recorder Co., 38 N. E. 1O9 [N. Y. 1894], holds that a mere
offer to retract cannot be shown in mitigation of damages but
inclines to the position that a retraction in good faith after
action brought may, under certain circumstances, be proved
in mitigation. This is in conflict with Evening News Ass'n v.
Tryon, 42 Mich. 549, and Bradford v. Edwards, 32 Ala. 628.
Of the proposition laid down in the present case there can be
no doubt whatever. On the authority of Storey v. Wallace, it
holds that "the retractions were not evidence of the circumstances under which the original publication was made or of
the good faith of the original publication. They were admissible, their publication having occurred before suit brought,.
and immediately following the libel, in mitigation of damages.
The language of Storey v.

Wallace, 6o Ill. 5I

[1871]

is:

"Equally untenable is the position of appellant's counsel that
the judgment should be reversed, because the publication of
retraction, under the circumstances, was an accord and satisfaction." * * * "The evidence shows that they published
this retraction as -a simple act of justice to the plaintiff, and
not as a condition of their being discharged from liability. Its
publication was a matter to be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages, and they were so instructed by the court,
but it had no other bearing upon the action."
The question of presumed malice is important as affecting
punitive damages. The second question of retraction is
related to both actual and punitive damages. The theory by
which a retraction is made available to reduce actual damages.
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is the very practical one that the injury caused by the orignal
publication is to some extent mitigated by the withdrawal of
and an apology for the libel: Storey v. Wallace, 6o Ill. 56;
Davis v. Marxzhausen. The retraction being admissible at all,
the circumstances and conditions under which it is made are.
to be given to the jury, and it is for it decide to what extent
the original injury to reputation has been repaired and
remedied. The relation of the retraction to punitive damages
raises the third question. To what extent is the retraction,
evidence of the motive of the publisher, that the original publication was without malice or for justifiable ends ?
On whatever theory punitive, vindictive or exemplary,.
damages are awarded, we have seen that they are bound up irk
the question of motive of publication. Absence of malice, due
care andj ustifiable end defeats them, while either proof of express
malice or the legal prestimption of malice, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, justifies them. Without citing many
cases, Bradley v. Cramer, 66 Wis. 297 [1886], and Turton v..
N. Y. Recorder Co., 38 N. E. IOO9 [1894], seem to decide
that retraction may be accepted as evidence of malice, or its
absence in the publication of the libel. It therefore becomes
available in mitigation of punitive damages. In both these
cases the court argues at some length on the subject, and
admitting the retraction as evidence would pass it to the jury,
but it is to be noted that it had already been submitted in
evidence for this purpose.
The present case would seem to decide that unless connected with the question of motive, by something in the pleadings or proofs, a retraction has no bearing on the question of'
punitive damages. In the present case the defendants desired
the court to make the inference that the publication of the
retraction disclosed that the libel was a mere mistake and done
in good faith. This was rejected by the court in these words:
"The retractions were not evidence of the circumstances under
which the original publication was made, or of the good faith
of the original publication." The retractions, as such, were
therefore held to be no evidence of motive whatever.
The wisdom of this is manifest. The "power of the press," so-
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much spoken of, but so seldom brought home to a person
through personal attack, should be strictly guarded when it
attempts to sully the reputation of the citizen, and the liability
of the publisher to punishment should not be limited to the
actual damage inflicted, which in some cases is very slight, by
a simple retraction, made after the libel has received a wide
circulation, and manifestly for the purpose of avoiding all
exemplary or vindictive damages. To throw the burden of
showing the relation between the retraction and the motive of
publication on the defendant, rather than leave it to the inference of a jury, is simple justice, for if such a relation exists
there should be no difficulty in establishing it. At the same
time such a rule holds the threat of substantial punishment
over the careless or negligent editor and publisher, it withdraws the consciousness of an easy escape from heavy damages by a mere formal retraction, and serves in a measure to
protect the citizen from one of the greatest powers for mischief
in evil hands which modern civilization has evolved.
May 20, 1895.
R. S.

